員工分紅費用化對研發支出之限制效應與對研發效率之影響

The Constraining Effect of Expensing Employee Bonus on R&D Expenditures and Its Impact on R&D Efficiency

本研究旨在探討員工分紅費用化中以公允價值衡量之規定導致費用化後臺灣上市（櫃）公司股票分紅大幅減少之現象，並造成現金分紅對研發支出之限制效應。本研究以2002至2012年臺灣上市（櫃）公司為對象，實證結果發現：(1)公允價值法所造成之可能衝擊愈高之公司，在費用化後其股票分紅減少程度愈大；(2)利用股票分紅節省現金分紅傾向較高之公司，在費用化後其現金分紅與研發支出之增額關係為負，且該增額限制效應會因現金受限度較大而更強。此外，上述公司在費用化後大幅減少股票分紅並顯著增加現金分紅與固定薪資、員工認股權等薪酬型態之比重，且其研發效率在費用化後相對提升，符合自由現金流量假說。上述發現為股份基礎薪酬促進研發支出之功能提供有別傳統之解釋。

This study investigates the potential impact of the measurement of fair-value employee stock bonuses (ESBs) after the ESB reduction from the implementation of the new regulations that mandated expensing employee bonuses (EBs). In addition, we examine the constraining effect of employee cash bonuses (ECBs) on R&D expenditures following the ESB reduction. By evaluating a sample of firms in Taiwan from 2002 to 2012, the empirical evidence shows that: (1) the potential impact of the measurement of fair-value ESB is positively related to ESB reduction around the time of the implementation of the mandated expensing EB regulations, and (2) following the ESB reduction, the propensity to replace ECB with ESB to save on cash is positively related to the incremental constraining effect of ECBs on R&D expenditures, in addition to ECBs, wages and employee stock options. Furthermore, the incremental constraining effect of ECBs on R&D expenditures was stronger for firms under higher cash constraints. Consistent with the free-cash-flow hypothesis, the R&D efficiency incrementally increased around the implementation period. These findings provide a different explanation of the traditional view of the role of share-based payments in encouraging R&D expenditures.