拆解被保護理由模型：對拉茲法律理由論的批判性反思

Debunking the Protected Reason Model: A Critical Reflection on Raz’s Reason-Based Account of Law

以實踐理由為分析基礎的法實證主義理論是當代英美分析法哲學的理論主流之一，採取此種取徑的理論核心主張為：法律根本性地建立在社會事實上；法律義務意謂法律觀點下的道德理由或義務；法體系宣稱其具有正當權威並能透過創設法律義務為法體系成員帶來額外的行動理由；法律透過為法體系成員的實踐理由製造差異來指引其行動。拉茲（Joseph Raz）結合其理由論創見、對規則的分析及服務性權威觀的法理論，為此理論取徑提供了最完整的說明性架構與證成基礎。本文試圖論證法律規則既不創造一階行動理由、亦不創造二階排它性理由，以反駁拉茲「法律規則創造被保護理由」的主張。

Positivist theories of law that focus on law’s reason-giving force have become prevalent in analytical jurisprudence. Such reason-based theories maintain that law is ultimately determined by social facts, that legal obligations are moral obligations from law’s point of view, that law claims its legitimate authority and its ability to give rise to additional reasons for action by the imposition of legal obligations, and that law guides people’s conduct by making differences to legal agents’reasons for action. Joseph Raz’s account, which combines the analysis of rules, the service conception of authority, and the double-layered structure of practical reasoning, constitutes the most complete theoretical framework among the reason-focused theories. By revealing the implausibility of law’s abilities to create first-order reasons and second-order exclusionary reasons, this article argues against Raz’s view that legal rules provide legal agents with protected reasons.