主權—例外狀態的弔詭：從阿岡本重返施密特

The Paradoxes of Sovereignty and the State of Exception: From Agamben Back to Schmitt

本文嘗試從阿岡本（Giorgio Agamben）所提出的「主權的弔詭」的問題意識出發，展開對於施密特（Carl Schmitt）例外狀態理論的重新詮釋：一方面深入探討施密特如何化解這個弔詭，另一方面則對阿岡本的詮釋進行分析與批判。主權的弔詭來自於：主權作為例外狀態的決定權得以合法地懸置法律，從而合法地置身法外。本文指出施密特化解此一弔詭的理論構想是從「獨裁的內在辯證」到「主權者的例外決斷」，而其中蘊含了從規範論到決斷論的基進轉向。接著本文進一步探究主權決斷的效力根源，並指出阿岡本因未徹底化施密特的決斷論，因此其詮釋仍然維持著弔詭。儘管如此，他所提出的對於例外狀態的「法律效力」的批判，仍然啟發著我們進一步思考主權決斷與暴力之間的可能連結。

Inspired by Giorgio’s Agamben’s thesis of“the paradox of sovereignty,”this essay is a re-reading of Carl Schmitt’s theory of the state of exception, and at the same time a critical engagement with Agamben’s interpretation of Schmitt’s theory. According to Agamben, the paradox of sovereignty originates from the sovereign’s power to decide on the exception (hereafter referred to as“the sovereign decision”), thereby legally placing himself above the law. Unlike Agamben, this essay argues that Schmitt has actually resolved this paradox, first through the“inner dialectics of the concept of dictatorship”and subsequently through the sovereign decision, which corresponds to his theoretical turn from normativism to decisionism. It then brings to light the hidden foundations of the sovereign decision that has remained underdeveloped in Schmitt’s own works. The essay finally contends that Agamben’s reading of Schmitt has been based on a misunderstanding of the purpose of Schmitt’s conception of sovereign decision as to realize the norm, thereby overlooked the capacity of his decisionism to resolve the paradox.