習時期中共地方治術：省委常委調整與組成分析（2012~2022）

Does Economic Development Influence the Decision-Making of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Regarding Appointments and Adjustments of Provincial-Level Party Standing Committee Members?

經濟發展績效是否影響中共省委常委的組成與調整？本文觀察習近平時期中共中央如何運用地方人事權治理地方。蒐整2012年至2022年省委常委資訊，本文觀察省委常委的中央下派與博士常委比例是否受到經濟績效的影響，並比較習兩任期的差異。統計結果指出，經濟發展績效越差會導致中央下派更多中央部委官員到地方任職，並任用更多的博士常委；此外，與習第一任期相比，習第二任期明顯較少下派中央官員，以及選任更多博士常委。進一步觀察省委人事與領導人考察之間的關係，分析發現一省有越多常委來自中央下派，習考察該省市的次數會顯著降低，顯示兩者或有互補效應。本文深化吾人對習時期中央地方關係之理解，也為將來分析習第三任期的地方治術提供了厚實基礎。

This article delves into the impact of economic development on the decisions of the Communist Party of China (CPC) regarding the selection and alteration of members within provincial-level Party standing committees. The study investigates how the CPC leverages its authority in personnel management to bolster local governance. By analyzing an exclusive dataset encompassing CPC provincial-level standing committee members from 2012 to 2022, this article assesses the repercussions of provincial economic growth on the adjustment of Party members within provincial-level standing committees. Specifically, the study examines the proportion of members appointed by the central government and the proportion of members holding doctoral degrees. The findings of the research indicate that a province with a lower economic growth rate tends to witness an increase in the percentage of its CPC standing committee members who have prior experience working within the central government before their current appointment. Additionally, a lower economic growth rate corresponds to a higher percentage of standing committee members possessing doctoral degrees within provincial-level CPC standing committees. Furthermore, the research also reveals that, in comparison to Xi’s first term, during Xi’s second term, the CPC significantly decreased the number of central officials dispatched to provincial governments while simultaneously promoting more officials with doctoral degrees to positions within Party provincial-level standing committees. Additional analysis suggests that in provinces with a higher representation of standing committee members originating from the central government, the likelihood of Xi Jinping conducting an inspection tour to that province diminishes. This observation suggests that personnel management serves as a compensatory measure for Xi’s direct inspections. This article not only contributes comprehensive research to deepen our comprehension of central-local relations within the Xi era but also establishes a foundation for future studies investigating how the central government strategically employs personnel management to enhance local governance during Xi’s third term.