愛德華滋與約翰衛斯理對自由意志的比較

Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley: A Comparison of Their Views on Freedom of the Will

愛德華滋主張意志與意志抉擇的同一性，目的是要避免意志行為落入無限追溯其前導意志的循環。他以常識論證支持意志自由，卻反對獨立的意志自主力，因為它無法脫離神性意志的命定。
衛斯理亞米念派區別意志與行使意志抉擇的自由，訴諸預先恩典來支持自主的意志抉擇力，但基於原罪論依然承認意志的自主不可缺少外力的神助。他批判愛德華滋的神性命定觀，以及他對預知理論的誤用，因為這種決定論讓意志自由無法存在，衝擊道德基礎。
本文以為，愛德華滋以意志與意志抉擇的不可分來否定亞米念主義並沒有說服力。衛斯理亞米念主義較符合看重互動以及抉擇的當代思維。但不管愛德華滋或衛斯理都無法解答終極的問題，亦即神人意志互動的可能模式。

Edwards’s premise is that will and its choice are identical; the aim of such a claim is to avoid any consequence of sinking into an infinite cycle of searching for a guiding will that precedes an act of will. He used common sense reasoning to support the freedom of human will, but denied the autonomous power of an independent will because it has no way to break from the predestination of divine will.
Wesley, appealing to the concept of prevenient grace, distinguished the will from the free choice to exercise the will. He grounded his ideas in the Christian doctrine of original sin, acknowledging that divine aid is indispensable for the autonomy of the will. He criticized Edward’s idea of divine determination because it renders the existence of free will untenable, shaking the foundation of moral virtues.
This article concludes that Edwards’s attempt to discredit the Arminian view of free will, by uniting will and its choice, is unconvincing. Both Edwards and Wesley are unable to solve the ultimate question of a possible mode of interaction between divine and human will. However, Wesleyan Arminianism accords more with contemporary thinking that emphasizes interaction and choice.