食之無味，棄之可惜？──論公然侮辱罪之解釋困境與將來展望

A Study on the Interpretation Dilemma and Future Prospect of Offense of Public Insult

本論文針對公然侮辱罪（下稱本罪）保護法益、構成要件與刑法第311條阻卻不罰事由之實務及學理解釋現況進行彙整觀察，且主要本於調和名譽法益與言論自由之基本權衝突之憲法視角，對本罪在刑法學上之釋義現況提出檢討淺見，尤其指出主流實務與學說對本罪之解釋，恐致使本罪產生若干違憲疑慮，無法順利通過違憲審查。而本於公法學上之合憲性解釋原則，即為維護法律安定性、落實立法者設計本罪之政策目的，避免直接主張除罪化反而衍生出國家對名譽法益保護不足之違憲質疑，故本文認為有必要先行探詢是否存有合憲性解釋本罪之路徑存在，而非逕行主張本罪除罪化，以達成上述合憲性解釋之正面效用。
基此，本論文賡續許宗力教授所提出以仇恨性言論概念合憲性解釋本罪之方針，進而指出此項限縮解釋：1）較能符合當今歐洲人權法院判決趨勢：歐洲人權法院原則上認為妨害名譽罪對於妨害名譽行為施以人身監禁處罰，所追求目的利益與帶來之損害乃不合乎比例，除非該言論涉及對其他根本性權利產生嚴重損害之例外情形，如仇恨性言論或煽動暴力言論。2）有助於消解本罪違憲疑慮：若能與晚近文獻提出之名譽法益新興理解進行結合，認為名譽僅係內容上指向個人之外部評價資訊；名譽法益係指個人立基於名譽資訊狀態所享有之正當（應得的）生活利益，則仇恨性言論因為實證研究上已然顯示出對於被害人有造成生心理健康狀態受損之危險性，故以仇恨性言論貶辱他人敏感性族群特徵（即：影響他人名譽資訊狀態），進而危害該他人之生心理健康（即：與名譽資訊相連動之生活利益），即屬妨害名譽之行為。因此若將本罪解為管制此等行為之規範，於違憲審查上，有助於提升本罪保護利益（追求公益）之重要性，更易通過目的正當性與衡平性階層之審查，且透過科學實證研究逐步充實敏感性族群清單，更能有效避免既有法益定性觀點導致本罪構成要件涵蓋過廣、缺乏法律明確性之違憲疑慮。誠屬現行法下可行之合憲性解釋途徑。

This article provides an overview of the current state of practical and academic interpretations of the crime of public insult (hereinafter referred to as ''the crime'') with respect to the protection of legal interests, its constitutive elements, and the grounds of impunity under Article 311 of the Criminal Law. In particular, this article would also point out that the mainstream practical and academic interpretations of this crime may lead to some unconstitutional doubts and fail to pass the constitutional judicial review. In order to maintain the legal stability and implement the political purpose designed by the legislators within this crime, and to avoid the unconstitutional challenge of insufficient protection of the state's reputational legal interests by directly advocating decriminalization, this article believes that it is necessary to first inquire whether there is a path to constitutional interpretation of this crime, instead of directly advocating decriminalization of this crime, so as to achieve the positive effect of the above-mentioned constitutional interpretation.
Based on this, this article continues Professor Hsu's idea of using the concept of hate speech to narrowly interpret this crime, and further argues that such a restrictive interpretation:
1) is more in line with the current trend of the European Court of Human Rights: the European Court of Human Rights has held in principle that the imposition of a prison sentence for the offenses against reputation will not be compatible with journalists’freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention unless in exceptional circumstances, notably where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence.
2) Helps to dispel concerns that the crime is unconstitutional. More specifically, if combined with the emerging understanding of the benefits of reputation in the recent literature, which suggests that reputation is only external evaluative information about an individual, and that the benefits of reputation are the legitimate (deserved) interests in life that an individual enjoys based on the information status of reputation, then the crime of hate speech has been shown in empirical studies to endanger the victim's physical and mental health, consequently, degrading the sensitive characteristics of another person's community (i.e., affecting the status of another person's reputation information) and further endangering that person's physical and mental health (i.e., the life interests linked to reputation information), constitutes an act of harming reputation. Therefore, if the crime is defined as a regulation of such behavior, it will help to enhance the importance of protecting the interests of the crime (pursuit of the public good) in the constitutional judicial review, and it will be easier to pass the examination level of the legitimacy of the purpose and the proportionality, and through scientific empirical research to gradually enrich the list of sensitive communities, it can more effectively avoid the constitutional doubts that the existing views of the nature of legal interest lead to excessive coverage of the constitutive elements of this crime and lack of intelligible principle. This is a feasible way to interpret the constitutionality under the current law.