顧憲成的《大學》改本與「格物」說──兼論顧憲成、高攀龍的格物之辯

Gu Xian Cheng’s Rewrite of The Great Learning and Theory of“Investigation of Things”- A Debate on the Investigation of Things of Gu Xian Cheng and Gao Pan Long

為了平息晚明「格物」說競起聚訟，涇陽改本申明其旨。他反對朱子格物補傳，通過格致釋文以「知本」與「修身」充實「格物」，再從「物有本末」賅攝八目並融會三綱以作為工夫總則，規定「致知」方向並結合為內返格知至善之性的立本工夫。由此架構出識性為要，以「明明德」為依歸、以「親民」為實地的「格物」義涵，為其《大學》詮釋的最大特色。由於涇陽要格的是物之本，「物」指的是能依於本而動的心意知家國天下，是以反對「格草木」；景逸要格的是心物相接，「物」還涵蓋了經驗世界的具體存在，因此肯定「格草木」。顧高格物之辯主要來自物我合一的意見分歧，即使後來涇陽不再限定知本取徑只有內求一路，但「格物只是辨箇本末」的基本立場並未改變。

In an attempt to quell the late Ming “Investigation of Things” that had been the subject of so much controversy, Gu Xian Cheng rewrote the text as clarification. In contrast to Zhu Zi’s Investigation of Things supplementary, he enriches the study of the nature of things with an explanation of “knowing the nature” and “self-cultivation”, and then highlights the eight categories of “things have their origin and end” and integrates the three principles as a general principle of study method, prescribing the direction of “investigation” and integrating it into the fundamental work of returning to the nature of things and supreme goodness within. In this way, the importance of knowing a thing’s nature is established, and the connotation of “Investigation of Things”, which is based on “Illustrating illustrious virtue” and “affectionate to the people”, is the most distinctive feature of his interpretation of The Great Learning. Since Gu Xian Cheng wanted to grasp the essence of things, “things” refers to the mind that can change according to the nature, which is used to know the whole world, so he opposed the “investigation of the little things in nature”; Gao Pan Long wanted to grasp the connection between mind and matter, and his “things” also covers the concrete existence of the world of experience, so he affirmed “investigation of the little things in nature”. Gu and Gao’s argument on the investigation of things mainly comes from the differences of opinion on the unity of things and oneself. Even though Gu Xian Cheng later ceased to restrict the path of investigating of the nature to only the inner study, his basic stand that “the investigation of things is only the identification of the nature of trivial things” remained unchanged.