政治制度與議會內閣制下的聯合政府治理

Political Institutions and Multiparty Governance in Parliamentary Democracies

在議會內閣制下，聯合政府內部的跨黨派委任關係帶來了代理問題，而許多學者也同意，政治制度是解決此一代理問題的重要關鍵。簡單的說，參與聯合政府的政黨，有充分的理由藉由不同的管理或者監督機制來避免可能的代理損失。本文首先針對聯合政府下代理問題的成因進行簡短討論，再透過相關的文獻回顧，檢視在共同治理的過程中，有哪些不同的制度可以被聯合政府內的政黨用來約束以及監督其執政夥伴的投機行為，以及這些制度的成效。最後，本文也針對此一文獻未來可能的發展方向，提出簡單的幾個建議。

While delegating policymaking power across party lines can create the principal-agent problem in multiparty governments, scholars widely acknowledge that political institutions are crucial in mitigating this issue. To avoid potential agency loss, parties in multiparty governments may employ various control mechanisms to keep tabs on their ruling partners. This paper begins by briefly discussing the causes of the delegation problem in multiparty governments. We then provide a systematic review of the current literature to demonstrate the institutional mechanisms available to coalition parties in the joint ruling process and the effects of these measures. Finally, we conclude the paper by offering a few recommendations for future research.