術業有專攻：學術獨立董事於功能性委員會之監督效果

To Specialize in a Particular Area: The Monitoring Effectiveness of Academic Independent Directors in Corporate Board Committees

本研究以2013年至2017年間台灣上市櫃公司資料，探討公司董事會之功能性委員會（薪酬委員會或審計委員會）中學術獨立董事對董事會監督的影響。本研究實證結果顯示學術獨立董事能夠於薪酬委員會中落實監督，以避免企業高階管理階層產生超額薪酬；亦能夠增強審計委員會的監督有效性，而強化財務報導品質。此外，本研究進一步發現在實務領域具有產業專精的學術獨立董事，較能夠藉由提供專業知識來增進公司董事會監督效果。故本研究彰顯了學術獨立董事於功能性委員會中發揮有效監督具重要作用。

This study uses the data of Taiwan’s listed firms from 2013 to 2017 to examine the impact of corporate board committees, specifically the compensation committee or the audit committee, with academic independent directors on board monitoring. The empirical results show that academic independent directors on the compensation committee fulfill their oversight to avoid excessive top management pay. Additionally, academic independent directors on the audit committee provide more effective supervision to improve the quality of financial reporting. Furthermore, this study finds that academic independent directors with industry expertise in relevant practice fields offer more professional knowledge to enhance corporate board monitoring. Overall, this study highlights the significant role of academic independent directors in committees in achieving effective board monitoring.