澳洲印太戰略軌跡

The Trajectory of Australia's Indo-Pacific Strategy

澳洲傳統的外交政策行為的最大特徵就是無論如何都要將美國留在亞太地區（否則將難有安全感），誠如其前外長畢曉普(Julie Bishop)所言，在此變化和風險日益增加的時代，澳洲將繼續支持「美國對全球和地區的領導。這是我們的長遠利益所要求的。國際秩序源自於力量，而美國強大的實力將繼續成為基於規則的秩序的重要基礎」。此一特徵在進入本世紀以來更成為澳洲兩大政治勢力的共識。
儘管如此，進入21世紀以來，澳洲所面對挑戰堪稱越來越大，使其領導人最不願意見到的另一傳統外交政策行為特徵(亦為困境)已然成真，即澳洲必須要在歷史（安全利益）與地理（經貿利益）間中做一選擇。不管願意或不願意，澳洲現在已站在十字路口。首先是中國大陸崛起，且成為澳洲第一大出口市場與第一大貿易夥伴，繼而是不受澳洲人歡迎的川普(Donald Trump)意料之外地當選美國總統，並帶來高度的不確定性與美國外交政策的巨變，一味高喊「美國優先」，無視澳洲一向重視的多邊自由貿易主義，甚至不惜發動貿易戰來構建一個美國認為正義的經貿秩序。遭逢此巨變，澳洲政府仍一再試圖像以往一樣強調澳洲不需要在歷史（澳洲安全合作夥伴美國）與地理（最大貿易夥伴中國）中做選擇，同時力圖通過「更努力地擴大國際影響」以應對外部環境的變化。
本文主旨即在探討進入21世紀以來為因應印太環境的快速變遷，澳洲外交戰略持續調整的軌跡。從2007年11月澳洲聯邦大選陸克文(Kevin Rudd)領導工黨（Australian Labor Party,簡稱ALP）擊敗霍華德(John Howard)所領導的自由黨－－國家黨聯盟（Liberal-National Party,簡稱LNP），獲得執政後，吉拉德(Julia Gillard)、艾伯特(Tony Abbott)、滕博爾(Malcolm Turnbull)、莫里森(Scott Morrison)至目前的艾班尼斯(Anthony Albanese)為止，這十五年間歷經六位總理，三次政黨輪替。此期間最引人注目的莫過於澳洲與中國關係的戲劇性變化，澳洲總理從西方國家中最知中的領導人陸克文到對中國全然不知而最敵視中國的莫里森。澳洲亦從中國崛起的最大受益人之一轉變為中國經貿制裁的最大受害者之一。直至莫里森失去政權，澳中關係始見好轉，但迄今短時間仍難以恢復到廿一世紀第一個十年蜜月期的水與乳融。
早在2013年5月工黨陸克文政府頒布的《澳大利亞國防白皮書》首度正式使用「印太(Indo-Pacific)地區」概念，提及「印太地區對於澳大利亞來說至關重要，與印度建立密切的戰略伙伴關係是澳大利亞戰略的重要組成部分。」過去工黨未必贊同一路倒向美國的外交政策行為，因為傳統上ALP較著重經貿利益與亞洲的關係，並不像LNP般的親美，但工黨在陸克文與吉拉德兩任政府則明顯的改變先前做法，積極強化澳洲武力與澳美的戰略安全合作，支持美國歐巴馬(Barack Obama)政府的重返亞洲的政策。陸克文任總理時重用對中鷹派安格諾(Carl Ungerger)主持國防白皮書撰寫，2009年公布的白皮書指稱中國的軍事力量對區域發展造成威脅，並警告亞太地區未來20年有可能發生戰爭，美國仍將是澳洲「不可或缺的」盟友。因而激怒北京。其後，維基解密也顯示陸克文告誡美國，應準備好必要時要對中國用武。
換言之，澳洲認識到與美國的安全聯盟對其安全和防務至關重要，是澳洲國際合作中最優先的重點，增加價值數十億美元的軍備，其中大部分從美國購買。吉拉德更進而與歐巴馬在2011年11月共同宣布2,500美國海軍陸戰隊入駐達爾文(Darwin)，這是二次大戰結束以來美國首度駐軍澳洲，凸顯澳美致力協力平衡中國的崛起。澳美雙方都體認到中國崛起的壓力，因而戰略利益更加交集。

With the rise of Donald Trump as U.S. President, his tariff war against China as well as tensions between the U.S. and other major trading partners have contributed to uncertainty that is hurting business and consumer sentiment, so are international supply chains. Economic interests of other economies might be compromised by the emergence of a new Cold War based on technology and trade between the two superpowers with the advent of the Biden administration.
The salient example is Australia's foreign policy moving from a pragmatic position of not choosing sides to effectively going all-in with the American view that China is a threat during the past more than six years. In the first decade of the 21st century, Australia held a positive view about China, believing that Australia’s future depended on China’s economic prosperity. This positive perception of China has gradually shifted to negative one since the late 2000s, when the emergence of the Kevin Rudd’s ALP government in 2007. Then, the Julia Gillard government and US president Barack Obama agreed to deploy US troops in Darwin in November 2011, as Australia and the US marked the 60th anniversary of the ANZUS alliance, the central security agreement between the two countries.1 This marked the first time that the US stations troops in Australia since the end of WWII. Another significant strategic meaning was that the US acknowledged that China’s hypersonic missiles posed a threat to its Guam base. Nevertheless, the Tony Abbott coalition government greatly advanced Australia’s economic interest via the conclusion of FTA with China in 2014 in addition to FTAs with South Korea and Japan in less than a year, Australia’s three most important trading partners in Northeast Asia and three largest sources of trade surpluses.
Conversely, the next LNP government under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (2015–2018) bumped into a double jeopardy, rising China versus declining America full of uncertainty. Threatened by China’s political penetration, Australia decided to invest US$17 billion for upgrading naval and air forces, including 72 F-35 Lightning II fighters. In addition, the Turnbull government enhanced strategic cooperation with like-minded countries in Indo Pacific region, with a particular focus on India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Last but not least, the government also was keen to strengthen bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with traditional European powers such as France, UK and Germany through arms purchases with an aim to possess independent defence capabilities and eventually to emerge as a major arm exporter in the next decade.
Furthermore, the successive Scott Morrison government made up its mind to put security interest ahead of economic interests. It overtly offended China by calling for international investigation over the origin of Covid19 and thus suffered from China’s economic sanctions. However, Morrison’s pro-US stance was awarded by the Biden administration with the AUKUS deal to help Australia acquire a fleet of nuclear-propelled submarines. The agreement signifies a converging strategic interests of the US and Australia. With the US security guarantee through the deal, Australia has emerged as America’s frontier against any possible hostile military action targeted at bases in Hawaii, given that Washington now shifts its strategic focus away from the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain to the Third Island Chain (New Zealand and South Pacific islands). Australia serves as the staple between the second and third chains. The power shift from the LNP to the ALP last year has not changed much in Australia’s evolving strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region. What the Anthony Albanese government has changed is its tone, rhetoric and profile. Still, Australia’s current security-dominated diplomatic posture is not impossible to change in the future. Sources to drive future policy shift are likely to come from three directions, the US, Australia itself and China.