債的概念解構與重構

德國民法體系將合同、侵權、不當得利合稱為債，並認為債編總則是三者提出的公因式，忽略了三者的根本不同。即令三者都有債權、債務，物權法也同樣產生此種法律關係。因為所有債之法律關係的特徵，都可以用以描述物之法律關係，物債二分之說無法成立。物權和人格權對世產生原生義務，合同在締約人間產生原生義務。應以對世、對人的區分、排他程度高低、法律關係之中介等三條軸線，取代物債二分。不當得利與侵權責任都是原生義務未被履行後，轉化成的次生義務，與合同、財產、人格是不同層次的概念。在《民法典》第118、468條下重構債的概念之方式為：債權就是請求權，而債是合同關係、物上關係、人格關係之上位概念。若日後《民法典》有大幅修改的契機，則應刪除債的用語，告別債的概念。

Using obligation as the umltrella term for contract, torts and unjust enrichment. and conceptualizing the general principles of obligation as the common factors utterly ignore the fundamental differences among the three. Granted, all three create claims-duties, but so does the law of property. The dichotomy of obligation and thing, a so-called fundamental principle, is contradictory as it ignores the claims-duties created by property law. Property and personality both create in rem primary claims-duties, whereas contracts create in personam primary claims-duties between the signing parties. The dichotomy of obligation and thing should be replaced by a new theory of three axes: the distinction between in rem and in personam, the extent of exclusion, and the mediation of jural relationships. Unjust enrichment and torts are nothing but secondary claims-duties transformed from unfulfilled primary claims-duties; thus, they are conceptually distinct from property, personality, and contracts. Given Articles 118 and 468 of the Civil Code. which include the term obligation, obligation should be reconceptualized in the following ways: an obligational right is coterminous with a claim, and obligation is an umbrella term for contractual relationship, property relationship and personhood relationship. If the Civil Code could be re- formed in the future, the term obligation should be avoided.