東協由下而上的因應G2的策略有助台灣舒緩日益緊縮的國際空間

Southeast Asia's 'Bottom-Up' G2: Loosening Taiwan's Tightening International Space

兩位美國學官爾棲的名人布里辛斯基（Zbigniew Brzezinski）與伯格斯坦（C. Fred Bergsten）在2009年提議美國與中共兩個超強構建兩國集團（US-China G2）的合作關係，但該提議在兩個集團內部都遭到負面反彈，尤其是那些遭到排除的國家，如日本、部份東協國家與歐洲聯盟國家以及台灣的不滿。本文主旨即在剖析東南亞國家如何透過東南亞國協（ASEAN），以由下而上（bottom-up）的策略因應G2，。此一策略與半世紀前創設東協時的理論基礎一致，即在終而討論東協此一策略對台灣與東南亞國家的意義。東協國家以ASEAN為槓桿在中共主控與公平無私間尋求平衡，在東協國家與中共發生南海領土紛爭時對北京傳送集體訊息（儘管此一事件也導致東協國家間出現罅隙）。東協國家並未透過ASEAN的集體行動來直接對抗北京的利益，因為沒有東協國家願意傷害其與北京的雙邊關係中的合作因素。可見，東協模式（ASEAN way）所強調的共識與尊重彼此的敏感課題是東協謹慎處理與周邊強權關係的不變定律。

The response to a new gee-strategic idea or concept often reflects how much the perception of this new idea reinforces or undermines the respondent's sense of security and strategic importance. Zbigniew Brzezinski's and C. Fred Bergsten's 2009 proposals for a US-China G2 relationship met with largely negative responses in each of the Gs and among those states excluded, particularly Japan, some ASEAN member states, some European states and Taiwan. For Taiwan, Brzezinski's follow-on views about the unsustainability of Taiwan's autonomy from China added to its particularly profound G2 concerns. It was not the core strategic judgement behind the two proposals that sparked resistance, but rather the postulated responses and their perceived impacts on the existing strategic order and underpinning institutions.