迎合、敷衍、議價與對抗：中國大陸新能源汽車政策中的央地互動

Complying, Pretending, Bargaining and Challenging: The Central-Local Interactions in Mainland China’s New Energy Vehicle Policy

新能源汽車，是中國在全球先進國家高新科技激烈競爭中，享有明顯優勢的項目之一。本文從「碎片化的威權主義」出發，經由對2001年到2020年中央政府的新能源汽車政策演變歷程的探究，和對上海、吉林、北京等省級政府的新能源汽車政策的案例研究，根據地方對中央態度積極與否與政策強弱，將省級地方政府的行為分為迎合、敷衍、對抗與議價四種典型行為。研究發現，中央政府在新能源汽車產業上雖無獨攬政策制定的大權，但仍居於較高地位；省級地方政府保有很強的政策自主性，不必完全順從中央的政策，甚至可能制定與中央政策相反的地方政策。即便在普遍認為中央權力得到全面加強的中共「十八大」之後，地方政府仍能在新能源汽車政策上抗拒中央。碎片化威權主義對於現今中國大陸的央地關係，仍具一定的解釋力。

The New Energy Vehicle (NEV) industry is one of the industries in which China has obvious advantages in the fierce global high-tech competition. By fragmented authoritarianism, this paper explores the evolution of the central government’s NEV policies from 2001 to 2020 and conducts case studies on the NEV policies of Shanghai, Jilin, and Beijing. This paper divides the behaviours of provincial governments by their attitudes and strength into four typical kinds: complying, challenging, bargaining and pretending. The central government cannot monopolize the power to formulate NEV policies, but it can still punish the local government that violates orders. Provincial governments have strong policy autonomy and do not have to fully comply with the central government. They can even make the local policies that are contrary to the central policies. Even after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which is widely believed that the power of the central government has been comprehensively strengthened, provincial governments are still able to go against the central government’s decision on NEV policies. Fragmented authoritarianism, to a certain extent, can still explain the current central-local relationship in mainland China.