論「標準必要專利」之「拒絕授權」行為與反競爭法議題－－以美國法為探討

Antitrust Liability to the Conduct of "Refusal to License" of Standard Essential Patent - Focusing on American Law

當一技術被「標準制定組織」（SSO）列為「標準必要專利」（SEP）後，市場參與者即不可避免地必須施用該技術，故SEP專利權人是否會濫用其因此擁有的優勢的「市場地位」，即為競爭法上之重要議題。關於此，有一常被探討的行為態樣—「SEP專利權人『拒絕授權』予供應鏈中特定層級之製造商」，是否為違法獨占；蓋SEP專利權人往往僅欲授權予供應鏈中「最終商品」製造商，藉此收取較高額的權利金，遂被「最小可銷售專利實施單元」製造商或主管機關以違反「公平、合理且無歧視」原則及違法獨占為由，頻頻提起訴訟。本文在分析SEP可能涉及的「關鍵設施原則」後，認SEP專利權人「拒絕授權予特定層級製造商」之行為態樣並不符合此原則，故其之不授權，不構成違法獨占；或僅可就其是否違反其與SSO之「契約上義務」論之，然此需視情形而論。

The concept of SEP (Standard Essential Patent) is - when any certain patented technology is selected by the "Standard Setting Organizations" (SSO) of that kind of technique as the commonly used standard, such the patented technology is categorized as a SEP. The SEP holder therefore enjoys stronger "market power" because the market participants have no choice but to use the SEP and are required to seek license from the SEP holder. Since a SEP holder might abuse his market power, his licensing behavior (inclusive of "refusal to license") might be of much antitrust concerns. Many SEP holders are accused of being the wrongful monopolist - whether by the manufacturers in the supply chain or by the authorities - because according to observations, many SEP holders tend to license only to the End-Product manufacturers rather than to the manufacturers of the "Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit" (SSPPU); they choose to do it with the aim to earn more royalties. After analyzing the "Essential Facility Doctrine" which SEP might have something to do, this article concludes that "refusal to license to manufacturers on specific level of the supply chain" doesn't necessarily constitute wrongful monopoly.