司法裁判中的事實及其客觀性

Facts and Their Objectivity in Judicial Decisions

在近年來學界發生的一場跨學科論戰中，雙方圍繞事實的概念、證據的概念以及兩者的關係等核心爭點展開論辯。在澄清司法裁判之論證結構的前提下可以發現，“以事實為依據”中的“事實”，主要指的是作為裁判結論之依據的案件事實。事實認定是一個從證據材料到證據事實，再到案件事實的過程，其間存在各種認知性推論和評價性推論的空間，有時甚至可基於法律規則直接進行事實認定或推定。司法裁判中的證據既可指證據材料，也可指證據事實，但兩者與事實(案件事實)均不相同。案件事實是認識論意義上的事實，但預設了一種對客觀真相的本體論承諾和規範性訴求。它可區分為案件事實認知和案件事實命題兩個層面，其客觀性由聚合論、共識論和符合論三重維度來確保。總之，“以事實為依據”的主張應當得到維繫，用“以證據為依據”來替代它並不妥當。

In an interdisciplinary dispute in the academic community in recent years, the two sides debated the core issues such as the concept of facts, that of evidence and their relationship. On the premise of clarifying the argumentative structure of judicial decisions, it can be found that the “facts” in “(adjudication) based on facts” mainly refer to facts of the case which constitutes the basis for the conclusion of judgment. Fact determination is a process from firstly evidence materials to evidence facts, then from the latter to facts of the case. There is room for various cognitive and evaluative inferences, and sometimes facts can even be directly determined or presumed based on legal rules. Evidence in judicial decisions can refer to both evidence materials and evidence facts, but neither is the same as the facts (facts of the case). Facts of the case are facts in the epistemological sense, but they presuppose an ontological commitment and normative claim to objective truth. They can be divided into two levels, ie. , the cognition and the proposition about facts of the case, whose objectivity is ensured by three dimensions of convergence theory, consensus theory and correspondence theory. In short, the assertion of “(adjudication) based on facts” should be maintained, and it is not appropriate to replace it with “( adjudication) based on evidence”.