英文摘要 |
For a long time, the moral hazard problem in China’s insurance industry has not been effectively dealt with due to a relative lack of theoretical concern. In the field of insurance law, the expression of’ moral hazard’is a normative concept which is concerned with morality and refers to that the insured party intentionally or gross negligently causes or expands the loss to occur or expand after having insurance coverage, including fraud during insurance contracting. The system of insurance has been doubted because of its negative externality of inducing moral hazard, but due to its huge institutional benefits and social value, it is necessary to develop moral hazard control mechanisms to reduce institutional costs and maximize social welfare. The moral hazard control mechanisms in insurance law have been extensively noticed, recognized and applied in China’s judicial practice, and are embodied in four forms: technologies, clauses, principles and rules. On this basis,’the combination of technical means and legal means’ and’the control of moral hazard shall conform to the principle of proportionality’should be taken as fundamental construction principles of the moral hazard control mechanisms in China’s insurance law. Furthermore, the moral hazard control mechanisms should be integrated through three aspects: application, time and subject. In this way, the moral hazard problem in China’s insurance industry could be solved through the improvement of the macro system and the optimization of micro norms. |