英文摘要 |
A major feature of the Chinese court system is its hierarchical structure under a political-le-gal system. However, this feature cannot fully explain the operational rationale of and the interest dis-tributing mechanism inside courts. Neglecting internal divisions of labor and divergent roles of members in Chinese courts has led to an oversimplified judicial reform, the 'Personnel Quota System' towards professionalism and 'elitism', which failed to effectively promote the status and career satisfaction of fro-ntline judges. A key to the personnel management reform is to realize that there is a dual structure of the personnel management system: court leaders and ordinary judges are stratified sub-groups and different professionals, in terms of career paths, mobility, promotion, social networks and so on. The stratifica-tion is not only a legacy of a historical pattern of the separation of officials (Guan) and local staffs (Li) in ancient China, but also an extension of the power structure of the current political-legal system. Mean-while, it is facing challenges from judicial professionalization and the modernization of China's govern-ance. In addition to labor division and cooperation, the dual structure also implies potential competition for resources, tensions, and balance. In the judicial personnel reform, which would inevitably redistribute interests, the existence of different sub-groups and their demands within the dual structure deserve more attention and consideration. |