英文摘要 |
Traditional reward system is based on actual performance. This system has two problems: (1) the problem of reporting incentive where the knowledgeable would not disclose their private information; and (2) the problem of performance incentive where workers shirk to avoid ratchet effects. In mid-1970 the Soviet incentive system gained widespread attention in academia. The model has evolved into the budget-based incentive system. Unfortunately, the academic steeple has pushed the direction of the development of the model to become too esoteric and intimidating to be explored and experimented by businesses to put into practical use. Gonik (1978) described that IBM successfully adopted this system in Brazil. This article, using a simple scenario in which a company rewards its accounts receivable clerks and Gonik’s model to combine company’s objectives, the knowledgeable clerks’ forecast and their achievements, returns to the basic model for the purpose of clear and easy exposition. This study differs from previous studies in two areas: (1) it gives the basic analytical tool for determining the incentive parameters for actual adoption of the system; and (2) under certain conditions, the reporting incentives and performance incentives are endogenous, however, in a simple reward system, the company’s objective is an important interface between two parties in the contract to ensure a well-operated incentive system. This article devotes a section in how to design a company’s objective system in order to avoid the problems of traditional incentive plans. |