機會主義者：英國、美國、台灣與李光耀的總理路（1955-1959）

Opportunist: Britain, America, Taiwan and Lee Kuan Yew’s Road to Prime Minister, 1955-1959

主流國際關係學者認為，美國在冷戰時期尊重英國在新加坡的殖民地位，故不干涉英國內政，也不介入獨立前新加坡的政治。此外，由於李光耀的反共形象，學者亦少質疑他與美國的友誼；而族群與意識形態接近的台灣，也常被認為與李光耀交好。本文以檔案與國際關係文獻為核心，回顧1950年代李光耀與英國、美國及台灣之間的關係，尋找李光耀不同的面貌。本文發現李光耀因其行為親北京，使英國與美國產生很大的爭辯，導致美國介入新加坡政治，迥異於主流學者的認知。身為殖民主的英國熟悉新加坡的華人認同政治，認為李光耀是機會主義者、政治變色龍，故可與他合作對抗共產黨。然而美國認為李光耀是地下共產黨，不可合作，更不允其領導新加坡，故支持反共的林有福。台灣的蔣氏父子基於反共而與美國分進合擊，於1959年新加坡大選以鉅資支持林有福，阻擋李光耀當選第一任總理。本研究解釋李光耀在1959年擔任總理之後和美、台關係仍然不佳，也進一步發現美國事實上在1959年大選干涉失敗後，才尊重英國對新加坡的政治安排。李光耀直到1965年與馬來西亞分離後，才開始與美、台建立友誼且意識形態明顯疏遠北京。而台灣對李光耀的戒心，因此在1960年代末期開始調整，到1970年代由於雙方合作才逐漸消融。

Since many scholars concur the U.S acceptance of Britain’s colonial policies during the Cold War, they therefore rarely study the phenomenon of American intervention in British internal affairs, especially with regard to pre-independence Singapore politics. Moreover, because of popular perceptions of Lee Kuan Yew’s anti-communist stance, scholars seldom question his relationship with Washington. Taiwan, due to its ethnic and ideological proximity with Singapore, was also widely believed to be friendly towards Lee. Using archival research, this paper reviews the relationship between Singapore, London, Washington, and Taipei during the 1950s, looking for different images of Lee Kuan Yew. This paper finds that contrary to mainstream argument, there were serious debates within the Anglo-American sphere over Lee Kuan Yew’s pro- Beijing tendencies. The UK, Singapore’s then colonial master and therefore was familiar with Chinese identity politics in Singapore, disregarded Lee’s words and deeds, believing him to be an opportunist and political chameleon and thus could be relied on as an anti-communist ally. The U.S, believing Lee to be a secret communist however, refused to cooperate with him, strongly opposed his leadership in Singapore, and supported the anti-communist Lim Yew Hock. At the time, Washington’s reservations dovetailed with those of Taipei. For the same anti-communist purpose, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo provided substantial funds to support Lim during Singapore’s 1959 general election in a bid to block Lee’s road toward becoming Singapore Prime Minister. This study explains Lee’s poor relationship with Taiwan and the U.S after he became the prime minister in 1959, and also finds that it was only after the failed U.S attempt to intervene in the 1959 election that Washington began to accept London’s plans for Singapore. Moreover, after Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965, Lee began to establish a closer friendship with Taiwan and the U.S, and became ideologically much less pro-Beijing. Taiwan’s antipathy towards Lee therefore began to change in late 1960s, and gradually vanished due to bilateral cooperation beginning in the 1970s.