審計委員會出席開會成員的產業與會計專業背景以及任期門檻，對實質活動盈餘管理之影響

The Impact of the Board Meeting Attendance of the Board Member Having Professional Background and Members' Tenure on Real Earnings Management

本研究卓參主管機關於2017年新增修訂獨立董事親自出席及任期9年應揭露等相關規定，並將該規定的立法精神延伸適用於審計委員會，探討若審計委員會成員符合該規定內容，對審計委員會監督效果之影響。實證結果發現，每次審計委員會，至少一席具有同產業或會計學經歷背景的審計委員會成員親自出席可抑制管理者操縱異常營運活動現金流量、異常生產成本之實質盈餘管理，與主管機關要求會議成員親自出席會議可強化監督效能之立法精神相符。此外，當至少一名審計委員會成員任期超過9年時，將提高異常生產成本與異常裁決性費用之實質盈餘管理，支持友誼假說觀點，與主管機關要求成員任期三屆應揭露說明，避免任期超過9年，影響獨立性之立法精神相符。

Using firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over-The-Counter from 2013 to 2019 as a sample, this study examined the relationship between real earnings management and the quality of audit committee. Audit committee quality was measured by two indicators: the attendance of member with expertise in accounting or industry, the member with tenure longer than 9 years. The results show that the attendance of member with expertise in accounting or industry will not execute the real earning management of the abnormal operating cash flow and abnormal production costs. The member with tenure long than 9 years will execute the real earning management of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. The empirical results are consistent with our hypothesis.