美國有線電視法之節目取得與載送規則研究

A Study of Program Access and Program Carriage Rules of the U.S. Cable Law

系所名稱：資訊社會學研究所 學位別：碩士 畢業學年：100年 指導教授：江耀國 90年代的美國有線電視產業已形成區域獨占，使有線業者具有瓶頸獨占力；有線業者和頻道商並透過垂直整合，擁有垂直整合企業的獨特能力；進而透過運用此兩種力量從事反競爭行為。為解決此問題，美國國會制定1992 年有線法，其中，節目取得與載送規則屬頻道交易之行為管制。節目取得規則起初僅適用於有線整合頻道商，以限制獨家交易而強迫分享頻道、並禁止歧視行為為手段，建立類似開放接取的制度，防止市場力延伸，避免替代性MVPD 無法取得必要頻道而喪失商業吸引力、或付出過高的成本而減損競爭力，屬具有結構限制效果的行為管制；其後，電信業者與具一定市占率的DBS 亦準用之。節目載送規則則禁止任何MVPD 以載送協議行歧視行為，避免市場力量的二次延伸。 本研究探討節目取得與載送規則1992 年至2010 年的管制歷程，兩規則實施以來，美國廣電市場已有重大變化，包括DBS 抬頭、電信業者參進與有線業者市佔率下降。然而，有線業者仍繼續進行水平與垂直整合以及叢集化，使都市叢集地區的獨占態勢牢不可破，是為FCC 兩度延長獨家交易限制落日之正當性。此外，FCC 透過法院支持的管制擴張，描繪出未來獨家交易限制落日後可能的管制模式。 最後，本研究亦發現我國廣電市場之結構問題與美國類似，亦發生頻道交易不合理之弊病，因此建議我國應參考美國法制，建立以開放接取頻道為核心的頻道交易管制、與以禁止差別待遇為中心的多頻道平台管理規範。

American cable industry became de facto monopolized in geographic areas in1990’s. In the same time, cable operators that vertically integrated with programmingsuppiers became combined entities. Such entities with both the bottleneck monopolypower and the unique power of vertical integration exercised anti-competitivebehaviors. Congress enacted the Cable Act of 1992, which added program access andprogram carriage rules that belong to conduct regulations with structural limitationeffect, to prohibit unfair or discriminatory practices.The program access rule principally prohibits exclusive contracts between acable operator and a vertically integrated programming vendor or discrimination by avertically integrated programming vendor, to ensure competing MVPDs “equalaccess” of “must-have” programming, preventing competing MVPDs from inabilityto attract subscribers or increasing costs of purchasing programming caused byleverage of market power. The program carriage rule mainly prohibits discriminationin carriage agreements by any MVPD to prevent MVPDs with market power frominfluencing more programming vendors, that could in turn harm the competiton of theMVPD market.The study focuses on the enforsing of the rules. Over the past 20 years ofenactment of the rules, the markets for both MVPD and programming creationcontinued to change dramatically, including increasing market share of DBS operators, decreasing market share of cable operators, and re-entry of telephone companies.Nevertheless, cable operators continue to horizontally concentrate, verticallyintergrate, and cluster. Because cable operators are still monopolists in clusteringurban areas, the FCC extended the exclusive contract prohibition in the programaccess rule twice. Moreover, by the process of the regulatory expansion the courtapproved, the FCC drew a possible regulatory framework after the sunset of theexclusive contract prohibition.The study also finds that there are similar structural problems and factors inTaiwan and the U.S. Therefore, the study suggests that Taiwanese agency refer toAmerican experience to design global conduct regulations of programming trade,particularly including the exclusive contract prohibition for behaviors of verticallyintegrated programming vendors, and the prohibition of discrimination for behaviorsof such programming vendors and MVPDs.