康德超驗心理學與形上學的統合

The Unity of Kant's Transcendental Psychology and Metaphysics

康德的《純粹理性批判》試圖透過審視認知能力的結構，為人類的知識重新奠基，並建立可靠的形上學。然而，這種革新形上學的進路不時被批評為心理主義。主流康德學者一直提倡撇除康德知識和形上理論中的心理學元素；但亦有些學者主張放棄康德過時的形上學，轉而發掘康德有關認知心理學的洞見。儘管兩派學者持相反立場，但他們都同意康德的形上學與心理學之間有難以疏解的矛盾。本文正是要疏解這個矛盾，透過論證康德的認知能力，根本並非屬於現象界或本體界，而是屬於抽象的超驗主體，來展示如何統合康德的超驗心理學與形上學。

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason attempted to lay a new foundation for human knowledge and metaphysics via a critical examination of our faculty of cognition. However, in light of his strategy of pursuing a revolution in metaphysics by investigating our cognitive faculties, Kant has often been accused of psychologism. In response, a dominant camp of Kant scholars advocates eliminating the psychological elements from Kant's epistemological and metaphysical theories. Yet, another camp of Kant scholars points to Kant's reflections on cognitive psychology as being the more valuable for contemporary philosophy, though these might be retained at the cost of abandoning the core of Kant's outdated metaphysics. Although these two camps hold opposing views, both see unresolvable contradictions between Kant's psychology and metaphys-ics. This paper aims to resolve the contradictions and demonstrate how Kant's transcendental psychology and metaphysics can be unified by arguing that the faculty of cognition does not belong to the phenomenal or the noumenal self, but rather to an abstract entity of the transcen-dental subject.