平臺扼殺式併購的反壟斷法規制

全球大型數字平臺通過“複製、收購與扼殺”的策略扼殺併購了大量初創企業，引發了創新賽道壟斷的顧慮。初創企業併購通常不會引起顯著的市場結構變化，但隨著時間推移，平臺“切香腸式”的扼殺式併購，在扼殺潛在競爭對手、強化自身市場支配地位的同時，更會扭曲長期創新供給，致使未來市場可競爭性喪失。而併購效率改進收益的消亡、創業者獎勵作用的證偽與動態競爭約束工具的全面失靈，進一步要求反壟斷執法機構應摒棄目前普遍不作為的監管做法，及時識別與規制平臺扼殺式併購。對此，有必要引入內部文檔調查、併購價格組成分析等併購動機過濾機制，識別出那些出於消除未來競爭威脅或扼殺潛在迭代式創新目的的初創企業併購；同時，通過引入補充性的申報門檻、設定更具針對性的審查補救措施與授權必要的事後調查，將能有效地遏制平臺資本的無序擴張，為初創企業創造一個不受主導平臺扼殺式併購威脅的現代化營商環境。

"Large global digital platforms merged many startups through the“acquire, copy or kill”strategy, raising potential antitrust concerns. Startups̓acquisitions usually do not cause significant market structure changes. Nevertheless, overtime, platform’s killer acquisitions will not only stifle potential competitors and strengthen their market dominance, but also distort long-term innovation, resulting in damage to future competition. The demise of natural monopoly effects, the failure of rewarding long-term innovation and the loose of dynamic competition constraints, suggest that the antitrust agencies should strengthen antitrust enforcement. Through investigating platform’s internal document and analyzing M&A price, the agencies could effectively identify those anti-competitive mergers. Finally, by introducing the transaction test in merger control, establishing more targeted remedies, and authorizing investigation of some consummated mergers, the agencies would be able to curb the platform’s disorderly expansion and protecting startups from being threatened by dominant platforms’killer acquisitions."