英文摘要 |
"Selective Law Enforcement (SLE) originates from a series of institutional constraints and is inevitable. The institutional constraint of Policy-based Selective Law Enforcement (PSLE) is that the organizational characteristics of administrative law enforcement agencies determines that they are inevitably embedded in the framework of the local government's central work, and that specific policy objectives re-place the enforcement objective of maintaining the desired legal order. Cost-based Selective Law Enforcement (CSLE) stems from the constraints of direct law enforcement costs and indirect law enforcement costs. The former determines that complete law enforcement is impossible and unnecessary, while the latter makes the SLE a way for administrative law enforcement agencies to mitigate the contradiction between statutory rules and the specific circumstances of society. Responsive Selective Law Enforcement (RSLE) results from the representative democracy centered on the concept of popular sovereignty, which determines that the legitimacy of the government comes from the effective response to the public opinion. Such a legitimacy basis requires the administrative law enforcement agencies to actively respond to the basic public opinion and the focus public opinion through SLE. Therefore, the way to effectively regulate the PSLE and RSLE is to include ''whether SLE is carried out within the scope of discretion'' into the government evaluation system. The way to effectively regulate the CSLE is to ensure sufficient financial re-sources for administrative law enforcement agencies and to establish an effective feedback mechanism for administrative law enforcement." |