"法學英文：Qualitex Company v. Jacobson Products Company, Inc., 514 U.S. 159; 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995)."

"第三，Jacobson指出許多早期案件﹙包含美國最高法院的案件﹚以支持Jacobson的論點。在1878年，本院廣義表述普通法的商標定義「可由姓名、記號、畫像、字母、形狀或圖案構成，如果其被製造商或零售商以指示自身製造或銷售的商品而能與其他人之商品產生區別」。本院在解釋1881年和1905年商標法﹙仍保留普通法定義﹚時，曾質疑「單一顏色可否作為有效的商標」，但是暗示「所有人皆可自由製造包含顏色的商品」。雖然這些陳述是大法官們的附帶意見，但聯邦下級法院將這些陳述解讀為禁止保護單一顏色作為商標。Third, Jacobson points to many older cases -- including Supreme Court cases -- in support of its position. In 1878, this Court described the common-law definition of trademark rather broadly to 'consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold by another.' Yet, in interpreting the Trademark Acts of 1881 and 1905, which retained that common-law definition, the Court questioned 'whether mere color can constitute a valid trade-mark,' and suggested that the 'product including the coloring matter is free to all who make it'. Even though these statements amounted to dicta, lower courts interpreted them as forbidding protection for color alone."