英文摘要 |
The United States military intervention in Afghanistan has dragged on for more than 19 years, despite the great operational performance, this war could not be won. This country, which President George W. Bush has committed to rebuild, still suffers from destitution and shelters radical terrorists. Problems on the pragmatic level such as American policy's lack of coherence, bureaucratical compartmentalization, and inefficient diplomacy, explain only partially why the war effort did not achieve its aim. On the conceptual level, however, the reasons why the war in Afghanistan has become a quagmire of attrition war, lie neither on the US military's operational or tactical inferiority, nor on the support to Afghan insurgents from the great powers which allowed for enduring resilience. In the final analysis, it was on the absence of strategy. Political leaders have conflated strategy with policy; military leaders, on the other hand, have substituted strategy with operational art, and finally strategy melted into the direct dialogue process between policy and operational levels. As a result, losing the opportunity to be adjusted in the strategic level, policy fluctuations which are ordinary in liberal democracy intervened directly in the military operations. Without translation and buffer effects created by strategy, the reality of battlefield supposed to be transmitted upward caused tensions in civil-military relationship and further reduced the effects of military operations. |