規範保護目的與構成要件解釋

當前刑法學研究中，規範保護目的一詞至少涉及三個場域：指涉法益的規範保護目的、指涉過失犯結果歸屬原理的規範保護目的以及指涉構成要件適用範圍的規範保護目的。在對構成要件進行解釋時，不乏觀點將指涉法益的規範保護目的作為討論重心，提倡一種以法益為中心的目的論解釋，從而將指涉法益的規範保護目的與指涉構成要件適用範圍的規範保護目的混為一談，導致以法益的確定替代構成要件的解釋，最終不當地為類推性的入罪化解釋提供了學理支持。這種方法論的法益概念困囿於法律道德主義思維，存在著整體判斷、循環論證、僭越立法等嚴重弊端，使法益概念本應具有的自由主義精神消失殆盡，並使刑法教義學喪失了批判品格。應拋棄指涉法益的規範保護目的所具有的入罪化解釋功能，強調其在建構出罪化事由方面所具有的無法為比例原則所取代的作用，亦即應否認方法論的法益概念，提倡批判性的法益概念。

In the existing literature of criminal law, the term of the purpose of normative protection involves three fields: the purpose of normative protection referring to legal interest, the purpose of normative protection referring to the principle of the attribution of the result of negligent crime, and the purpose of normative protection referring to the scope of application of the constituent elements. When interpreting the constituent elements, there are so many scholars that regard the purpose of normative protection that refers to legal interest as the focus of discussion, promote a teleological interpretation centered on legal interest, and take the normative protection referring legal interest as the purpose of normative protection referring to the scope of application of the constituent elements. It will lead to the result that the determination of legal interest replaces the interpretation of the constituent elements, which ultimately improperly provides academic support for the analogy interpretation. This kind of methodical concept of legal interest subjects to the thought of legal moralism, which results in serious drawbacks, such as holistic judgment, circular argumentation, unlawful exercise of criminal legislative power, and loss of the spirit of liberalism. Those drawbacks make the concept of legal interest lose its original liberal spirit, and also make the dogmatic of criminal law lose its character of critical spirit. It should abandon the criminalized interpretation function of the purpose of normative protection referring to legal interest, and emphasize its role in finding justifiable reasons instead, that is, it should deny the methodical concept of legal interest and advocate the legal-critical concept of legal interest.