董事會結構與投票行為

The Structure and Voting Behavior of the Board of Directors

本文建構理論模型，詮釋聘用不同比例的獨立董事，對於董事會投票行為的影響。本文理論證明獨立董事比例愈高，董事會效率愈佳，愈能採納對組織有利的政策案，亦即獨立董事聘用比例提高，可增加公司價值。其次，本研究發現，獨立董事比例偏低時，對於不利於公司價值的政策案，且獨立董事無法影響投票結果時，較可能出現獨立董事放棄自己立場，順著內部董事意向，投下不符合組織發展的選票。另外，獨立董事主導的董事會，在董事之間有較大資訊不對稱情況下，獨立董事對政策案品質的辨認會如「預防公司價值折損論點」所預期，此情況下，較可能出現好的政策案被否決。本文進一步研究顯示，獨立董事若有一定的任職期間，可減少董事之間資訊不對稱，則獨立董事對政策案品質的辨認會轉向「內部董事訊息傳遞論點」，可避免好的政策案被否決。

In this paper, we construct a theoretic model to explain the effect of different proportion of independent directors to the voting behavior of the board of directors. We verify that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the more efficient of the board of directors and the higher the possibility to adopt major policy they preferred, as well. In other words, it means that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the higher the value of corporate. We also find if the proportion of independent directors is lower and the independent directors cannot affect the voting outcome of major policy which is against the value of corporate, the independent directors are inclined to give up their position, follow the intention of inside-dominated boards and vote against corporate preferred. Moreover, under information asymmetry within the board of directors, the recognition of independent-dominated directors to major policy will be anticipated by the aspect of “preventing corporate value loss”. It means that some positively major policy will be vetoed. Furthermore, this paper shows the recognition of independent-dominated directors to major policy will be anticipated by the aspect of “insider directors information transmission”, if the independent directors have certain period in their position and less information asymmetry. It means that some positively major policy will be passed through.