CEO繼任、審計公費和公司價值：併論產業知識的角色

CEO Succession, Audit Pricing, and Firm Value: The Role of Industry Knowledge

本文探討新任CEO的產業知識對於審計公費和公司價值的影響。透過個人和專業背景在商業環境中的緊密聯繫，CEO建立了橫跨個人和組織的網絡，從而獲取了產業知識。相較於相關產業以外的公司，聘任來自相關產業其他公司的新任CEO或來由公司內部拔升的新任CEO需要較多的審計服務，進而提高審計費用。我們另發現代理成本（因所有權與經營權分離而產生）會增加審計費用以補償額外的審計服務，以及雇用與相關產業有關的新任CEO（通過外部招聘或內部晉升），對於代理成本和審計費用間之正向關係具有部分的中介效果，我們並進一步發現擁有產業知識的新任CEO可以提升企業價值。本文另以不同的樣本和方法進行增額測試，以增強上述實證結果之穩健性。

This paper examines whether new CEOs with industry knowledge (IK) influence audit pricing and firm value. Through repeated personal and professional contacts in the business community, CEOs establish networks across individuals and organizations, which enhances the acquisition of IK. Relative to those from outside the related industries, firms with the new CEO from another firm in the industries or firms with a new CEO from inside the company demand more audit effort, which raises audit fees. We also find that agency costs (which shareholders incur due to the separation of ownership and control) increase audit fees to compensate for additional audit effort, and new CEOs from firms in the related industries (via external recruitment or internal promotion) partially mediate the positive relationship between agency costs and audit fees. We further document that firms with new CEOs who have IK garner a premium. These results are robust to alternative specifications.