英文摘要 |
Purpose–Insurance companies issue warnings to applicants regarding the Duty of Disclosure as stipulated in Article 64 of the Taiwan Insurance Act. Our analysis aims to determine whether the timing of informing the applicants, either in advance or after the fact, would have varying impacts on their behavior. Design/methodology/approach–We conduct a three-stage experiment involving students to gather data. Additionally, we examine the effects of different types of warnings by analyzing real insurance policies data. Findings–Our findings indicate that applicants exhibit a greater level of truthfulness when they receive warnings in advance, as opposed to receiving them after the fact. Moreover, the disclosure rate of applicants is higher when warnings are provided in advance. Research limitations/implications–We consider the psychological impact on insurance consumers when dealing with traditional insurance issues. This research can also be applied to the problem of asymmetric information in the insurance market. Practical implications/Social implications–Our results indicate that the cost of adverse selection can be reduced by using different types of warnings at a very low cost. The Financial Supervisory Commission can also use our findings to strengthen its overall supervision. Originality/value–This study represents pioneering research in the realm of behavioral insurance and holds the potential to significantly contribute to its practical implementation and real-world applications. |