投資與不確定性間的關聯：投保董監事及重要職員責任保險之影響

Investment under Uncertainty: The Effect of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance

實質選擇權理論指出投資與不確定性間存在負關聯性，但經理人風險趨避亦造成投資過度反應可分散的公司特有風險。本文援此探討台灣公司投保董監事及重要職員責任保險（D&O 責任險）後其投資對波動性的敏感程度。實證結果指出對高經理人持股公司而言，投保D&O 責任險會減緩公司投資對其特有波動性的敏感程度，隱含投保D&O 責任險有助鼓勵公司承擔非系統風險、減緩投資不足並與股東價值連結。實證結果亦指出上述投保D&O 責任險效果主要作用在低融資限制公司與高訴訟風險公司。最後，實證結果指出投保D&O 責任險有助提升公司實質選擇權價值。

The real options framework indicates a negative relation between corporate investment and uncertainty. However, managerial risk aversion leads corporate investment to become sensitive to diversifiable firm-specific risk, which may not be optimal from the perspective of shareholders. This research thus examines the investment-uncertainty relation based on the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability (D&O) insurance. Analysis of listed firms in Taiwan shows that D&O insurance alleviates investment sensitivity to firm-specific volatility for firms with high managerial ownership. This is consistent with the notion that D&O insurance encourages insured executives to bear appropriate risks and mitigates underinvestment from the perspective of well-diversified shareholders. This study further documents that the effect of D&O insurance is pronounced mainly for firms with low financial constraints and high litigation risk. Finally, this study finds that D&O insurance improves the value of real options.