管理階層法律責任與企業租稅規避

Managerial Legal Liability Coverage and Corporate Tax Avoidance

本文旨在探討管理階層法律責任對企業租稅規避程度之影響。藉由以投保董監事暨重要職員責任險及所報導之財稅差異分別作為管理階層法律責任及租稅規避程度之代理變數，本文研究結果顯示，管理階層因投保責任險所降低之法律責任，將可減緩企業財稅差異幅度，且隨著公司治理機制愈佳，減緩企業財稅差異幅度的效果愈明顯。此外，路徑分析檢測結果亦發現，因投保責任險所降低之管理階層法律責任會透過財務報導品質及風險承擔程度之中介效果而影響財稅差異的幅度。整體而言，研究結論支持管理階層法律責任的減輕有助於抑制經理人自利行為之論點。

This paper investigates the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on corporate tax avoidance. Using directors' and officers' liability insurance coverage as a surrogate for managerial legal liability coverage and book-tax difference as a proxy for tax avoidance, we find that higher levels of managerial legal liability coverage are associated with smaller absolute book-tax difference and that this relation is strengthened by governance mechanisms. Further tests based on path analysis show that financial reporting quality and risk-taking attitude seem to be two underlying mechanisms through which managerial legal liability coverage affects absolute book-tax difference. Overall, our findings provide support to the contention that managerial legal liability coverage weakens the effect of managerial opportunism, resulting in a decrease in absolute book-tax difference.