半總統制下的立法課責：臺灣與法國國會制度面的比較研究

Legislative Accountability under Semi-presidentialism: An Institutional Comparison between Taiwan's Legislative Yuan and French National Assembly

本文探討半總統制下的立法課責，以臺灣與法國為個案進行比較研究。「立法課責」指如何讓立法者（集體或個別）的所作所為能為利害關係人知道，而據以獎懲。過去比較臺、法的研究發現，總理總統制的法國，國會的運作型態較偏內閣制；總統議會制的臺灣，運作則較偏總統制，因而在傳統印象上，多會認為法國會較重視以政黨為對象的集體課責，臺灣則可能較偏重以候選人或立委為對象的個別課責。本文乃透過制度規範上對選舉前與選舉後的資訊公開要求，比較臺灣與法國在集體課責與個別課責上的差異。選前集體層次的討論包含國會選舉制度與政黨管理，個別層次討論的是候選人的資訊公開規範；選後集體層次關注的是國會全體，個別層次討論的則是國會議員的個別資訊公開。本文的研究發現有三：第一，單一選區制下的立法課責，會較推向立委個別受選區課責，但法國的兩輪投票，容易造成政黨採取聯合競選策略，因而政黨集體受選民課責的意涵會較臺灣重。第二，對於選前的資訊公開，法國要求政黨與候選人揭露資訊的程度，多較臺灣高，故集體課責性與個別課責性都較臺灣佳。第三，對於選後的資訊公開要求，法國的規範亦較嚴謹，故法國的集體及個別課責性也多較臺灣高。綜合而言，法國對政黨的集體課責與對議員的個別課責，無論在選前或是選後，資訊公開的相關規範都較臺灣細密嚴謹，或可為臺灣推動國會改革或法規修正之參考。

This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi-presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. ''Legislative accountability'' refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan's presidential-parliamentary is most similar to a presidential one. Therefore, under the traditional impression, France will pay more attention to the collective accountability on political parties, while Taiwan may prefer the individual accountability on legislators. This article then compares the information transparency requirements before and after an election in order to find the differences between Taiwan and France. Before an election, at the aggregative level, the authors make a comparison between the parliamentary electoral system and political party management; at the individual level, the authors compare the information transparency for candidates. After an election, the comparative objects are the whole parliament and legislators at the aggregative and individual levels, respectively. This paper has three findings: first, the legislative accountability under a single-member district is more inclined to individual accountability and legislators were supposed to be more responsive to their constituency principal(s). However, the two-round voting system is more inclined to collective accountability, since political parties usually take a joint campaign strategy, the collective accountability then will be more valued. Consequently, France valued collective accountability more than Taiwan. Second, in the extent of information transparency before an election, France asks political parties and candidates to provide more information than Taiwan; thus, both the collective and individual accountability, France is better than Taiwan. Third, as for the information transparency requirements after an election, French regulations are stricter than Taiwan's both at the aggregative and individual levels. Therefore, in both collective and individual accountabilities, France is better than Taiwan. In conclusion, French regulations of information transparency are more stringent than Taiwan in both collective and individual accountability on political parties and legislators, no matter before or after an election. Therefore, the French style may be a reference for Taiwan to promote parliamentary reform or regulatory revisions.