共同犯罪歸責基礎的規範理解

客觀因果以及主觀意圖僅僅描述了共同歸責的各種實然前提，並不能為應然的共同歸責提供充分根據；對存在論要素的種種規範化努力則可能既背離了存在論的立場，又扭曲了規範論的本意。學界因此提出了諸多純粹的規範化路徑。遺憾的是，這些路徑不僅沒有確立真正的歸責基礎，反而使原本潛藏於存在論路徑中的啟示更顯混沌。應當回到一般歸責理論的出發點，即自由律對因果律的超越尋求共同歸責的規範基礎。如果以自由為中心規範性地理解共同犯罪，就會發現共同犯罪是一種歸責形態，只有當數人任意地行使自己的行為自由，共同妨害了他人的自由時，才是可共同歸責的。換言之，共同犯罪人在規範上表達了共同塑造構成要件之實現的意義，所以構成要件的實現要歸責於全體共同犯罪人。

Objective causality and subjective intention only describe the actual premises of common imputation, and do not provide a sufficient basis for it. Various normative efforts on the elements of ontology may deviate from both the ontological position and the original meaning of normative theory. The existing literature has therefore proposed many purely normative paths. Unfortunately, these paths not only do not establish a true basis of imputation, but make the enlightenment hidden in the paths of ontology more chaotic. Therefore, it is necessary to return to the starting point of the general imputation theory, which is the transcendence of the law of freedom over the law of causality, to seek the normative basis of common imputation. If we understand the joint crime in a normative way with freedom at the center, we will find that the joint crime is a form of imputation. Only when several people exercise their freedom of conduct arbitrarily and collectively impede the freedom of others, can they be imputed together. In other words, the joint offender expresses the meaning of forming a crime normatively, so the realization of the crime is imputed to all joint offenders.