刑事審判中的事實問題與法律問題

隨著《人民陪審員法》的通過，事實問題與法律問題的區分從純粹的理論探討轉變為迫切需要解決的現實問題。但是，這一問題不局限於陪審語境，在整個刑事審判場域下均具有普遍的意義。與哲學上的討論不同，刑事審判中的“事實”“法律”及其分類具有權力（利）界定的功能，它確定人民陪審員與法官、初審法院與上訴法院之間的許可權。刑事審判中的事實進一步細分為構成性事實和證據性事實、一般事實和專業事實，它還進一步確定法庭與鑒定人、普通證人與鑒定人的許可權。在我國獨特的司法解釋體制下，審判法院與最高法院在法律問題上分享具體解釋權和抽象解釋權。帶著中國問題意識，以基本語義為基礎，再從功能主義出發引入特別的政策考量作出適當的修正，也許是一條解決區分難題的務實路徑。

With the adoption of the People's Assessors Law, distinguishing factual issues from legal issues has become a practical problem that urgently needs to be solved. This problem is of general significance in the whole context of criminal trial. Different from the discussion in philosophy, the terms ''fact'' and ''law'' as well as the classification of them are of authority defining functions, which determines the limits of authority between people s assessors and judges and the authority between trial courts and review courts. Facts in criminal trial could be subdivided into constitutive facts and evidential facts, and even further into general facts and professional facts, which determine the authority limits between the court and the expert and that between ordinary witness and expert witness. In China s current judicial interpretation framework, the trial courts and the Supreme Court share the authority of concrete and abstract interpretation. To solve the difficulty of classification, apragmatic approach may be, to take China's realities into consideration, taking the basic semantics as basis and introducing functionalist policy consideration as modification.