制度成本與規範化的反壟斷法

在經濟學理論的推動下，現代反壟斷法的基本分析方式經歷了從當然違法原則向合理原則轉變的過程。但合理原則也使得反壟斷分析變得複雜而成本高昂。更重要的是，合理原則與法律的規範性存在明顯衝突，會產生違反法治原則、削弱威懾效果的後果。因而有必要反思經濟學與反壟斷法進一步融合的方式。通過對四種制度成本的分析可以看到，當然違法原則在案件查處成本、行政成本上更低。雖然立法成本更高，但通過提高反壟斷法的類型化程度，當然違法原則也具有規則適用上的成本優勢。同時，就動態規制效果而言，當然違法下的錯誤成本要比傳統理念所認為的更小。因此，反壟斷法的規範性要求經濟學和反壟斷法以新的方式融合，更多地適用當然違法原則。

Driven by the continuous development in economics, contemporary antitrust law has experienced the transition from per se illegality to the rule of reason. However, rule of reason makes antitrust analysis more complex and costlier. It also generates obvious conflicts with the normativity of law, thereby contaminating the rule of law and weakening the deterrent effect of enforcement. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect on the further integration of antitrust law with economics. After evaluating the four types of institutional costs, advantages of per se illegality are observed in lowering investigation costs and administrative costs. Although the legislative costs might be still higher than the rule of reason, per se illegality still wins an edge when the categorization within antitrust law is improved. In the meanwhile, the error costs related to per se illegality are certainly exaggerated by conventional understanding when evaluated under dynamic regulation. Consequently, the normativity of antitrust law requires the integration in a new way, as well as more application for per se illegality.