審委會與合議庭：司法判決中的隱匿對話

中國的司法判決邏輯不僅體現在合議庭做出的判決書中，審委會是決定“難辦案件”的重要機構，代表了司法判決的深層邏輯。只有將審委會與合議庭結合起來，才能豐富抽象概括出的司法與政治有機統一命題，也才能完整揭示“中國法官如何思考”。借助某中級人民法院2011－2015年間的審委會記錄，通過比較審委會與合議庭對相同案件的不同分析，能夠勾勒出兩者之間存在的互動機制：合議庭歸納的爭議焦點決定了審委會的討論方向，而審委會的決定既是判決的底線和前提，更是合議庭據以抵抗外在干預的後盾。由於審委會所考慮的很多問題不能夠公開，當事人和大眾只能通過判決書之外的方式瞭解這些資訊，因此上述互動更像是兩者間的“隱匿對話”。審委會的決定更像是利益選擇，對其的監督之道不在於公開信息，而在於完善議事規則、健全民主集中制。

The logic of judicial decision in China should not only be drawn from the verdicts. What the Judicial Committee discussed and decided consist another dimension of ''How judges think in China'', especially in hard cases. Drawing on the records of an intermediate people’s court from 2011 to 2015, this paper proposes a new approach to understanding the logic of judicial decision-making. There exists an interactive mechanism between the judicial committee and the collegial panel in China’s courts: the focuses of the dispute concluded by the collegial panel guide the later discussions of the judicial committee, while the decisions of the judicial committee determine the collegial panel’s verdict by giving principles and bottom lines. This interaction is more like the ''hidden dialogue'' since the records of the judicial committee are confidential documents. The parties and the public can only understand the discussions and decisions of the judicial committee in ways outside the publicized judgments. The decision of the judicial committee is more like a choice of interests. Therefore, the appropriate method to supervise it is not to disclose information, but to improve the rules of procedure and improve the principles of democratic centralism.