半總統制下的國會監督－－從法制面比較台灣與法國國會的監督能量

Parliamentary Oversight Capacity under A Semi-Presidential System - An Institutional Comparison between Taiwan's Legislative Yuan and the French National Assembly

半總統制的設計，通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會；在此體制下，由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施，國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量，則在文獻上甚少探討，也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家－臺灣與法國，並從較傳統的制度面切入，來探究兩國在制度設計安排上，賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排，主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備；以及目前國會及委員會運作上的成文規範。本文的比較以法國國民議會與我國的立法院為基準，因法國的國會雖有參議院與國民議會兩院，但國民議會無論是議員產生的方式，或是所擁有的權力，都與我國立法院較相似，故以國民議會作為兩國的比較案例。而在比較實際操作規範部分，則以臺灣的第七屆，共113位立法委員，與法國的第十三屆，共577位國民議會議員，其運作所依據的成文法則為對象。本文的主要發現為：從國會監督能量這單一面向比較而言，臺灣比較接近總統制的國會監督，而法國則比較接近內閣制的國會監督。臺灣的立法院目前所擁有的監督能量遠大於法國的國民議會，這多少意味著，就臺、法國會監督能量比較而言，臺灣帶有較多總統制的設計，法國則仍較靠向內閣制的安排。

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system's parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically interesting but literarily lacking topic. It compares the semi-presidential systems in both countries-Taiwan and France-from the traditional perspective of institution, with aims to know to what extent have their institutional designs vested the oversight powers unto their parliaments respectively. The institutional designs mentioned here include constitutional laws or enactments that are relevant with the powers and resources delegated to the parliaments, committees and individual legislators. These also include the written rules currently implemented in the parliaments and committees in both countries. The comparative study carried out in this research will primarily focus on the French National Assembly and Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. Although the French Pariliament consists of the Senate and the National Assembly, it is still much similar with the Legislative Yuan in that the means for the National Assembly to elect its senators or the power assumed by which bear some resemblances with those in Taiwan. Therefore, the National Assembly will be the cardinal case for this study. As for the implementations of this research, it focuses on the 7th Assembly of Legislators in Taiwan (113 total) and the 13th Assembly of senators (577 total) in France, as well as the conventional laws for researches. The result of this study shows that as oversight powers of both parliaments are inspected, Taiwan is closer to a presidential system whereas France to a cabinet system. It also shows that the Taiwan's Legislative Yuan carries far greater oversight powers than France's National Assembly, which more or less suggests, in terms of check and balance power of parliament, the systematic design of Taiwan prones to the presidential system more in comparision to the cabinet proclinition in France.