從牟宗三道德形而上學角度分析和辻哲郎人間倫理學與孟子五倫之關係

On the Relation between Watsuji Tetsuro's Ningen Rinrigaku and Mencius' Five Relationships-A Critique from the perspective of Mou Zongsan's Moral Metaphysics

「間柄」是和辻哲郎的人間倫理學中深受儒學影響的重要概念。他對間柄的反思始於孟子的五倫概念；故此，和辻似乎嘗試重新詮釋五倫。然而，與陽明學及二十世紀中國新儒家相反，和辻並不強調個人主體性；反之，在《人間倫理學》及《風土》裡，和辻把個人主體還原成間柄，又將間柄歸於佛教「空」的概念。根據牟宗三的道德形而上學，本文認為和辻的人間倫理學無法為孟子之五倫提供一致的詮釋。根據牟宗三，個人主體所具有天賦之心性乃先於並生出人倫關係。然而，「天」的概念卻不見於和辻對《孟子》的反理學詮釋。和辻認為個人道德意識緣起於作為對自我與他者否定之間柄，可是自我否定之主張卻與《孟子．盡心上》的說法相違。然而，本文指出，除了批評和辻曲解《孟子》以外，讀者或可理解和辻的人間倫理學為一非儒學的新倫理學，而非對孟子的一致詮釋。

Watsuji Tetsuro's idea of aidagara ( 間柄, often translated as 'betweenness') is an essential concept in his ningen rinrigaku with a robust Confucian heritage. As he begins his reflection on aidagara from Mencius' concept of gorin or 'five relationships' it seems that Watsuji tries to reinterpret gorin. However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth-century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasise individual subjectivity. Instead, in both Rinrigaku and Fudo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of Ku. In light of Mou Zongsan's moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji's ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius' teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual's subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven preceds and producs mutual relationships among human beings. However, such idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji's anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji argues that the individual's moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others. In fact, his notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji's ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.