納入延遲策略下的政府環境誘因管制分析

An Analysis of Governmental Environmental Incentive Regulation with Delay

鑒於過往關於資訊不對稱下的環境管制分析，皆未將環境管制當局可採取延遲（delay）策略，做為管制政策工具的可能性納入討論的範圍。本研究擬擴展Boyer and Laffont（1999）的當事－代理（principal-agent）環境管制分析架構，將政府環境管制當局可以採取延遲策略，做為其環境誘因管制（environmental incentive regulation）工具的可能性納入考慮，建構一個考慮延遲策略的環境誘因管制模型，進行政府環境誘因管制措施的福利與經濟影響效果分析，我們除了將探究政府環境管制當局在何種情況下，可以藉由採取延遲策略來達成提升社會福利水準的目的外，亦將針對受管制廠商之國籍別（本國或外國籍），對於資訊不對稱下政府最適環境管制措施的可能影響提出說明。

The past environmental regulation analyses under asymmetric information often disregard the possibility that environmental regulatory authorities may take the delay strategy as regulatory policy tool. This research will construct a model of environmental incentive regulation with delay by expanding the model of Boyer and Laffont (1999). Using our structure, we engage in economy and welfare effect analysis of environmental incentive regulation measures. We explore the condition that the regulation delay can improve social welfare. In addition, we explain the potential influence of the nationality of firm on governmental environmental regulation measures.