共益債務融資的實踐進路與法律保障

Practice Approach and Legal Protection of Mutual Benefit Debt Financing

從企業破產實踐檢視共益債務融資類型及時間範圍的司法擴大解釋現狀，主張法院應遵循「共益」與「為債務人繼續營業」之判斷標準予以適度擴張並限制其邊界。從法解釋學之角度分析中國大陸《破產法司法解釋三》第2條中關於「提供借款的債權人主張參照企業破產法第42條第4項規定優先於普通破產債權清償的，人民法院應予支持」之規定的具體涵義，指出該條款存在的邏輯不嚴密、措辭不嚴謹之缺陷，建議中國大陸企業破產法修訂時，應予以矯正。聚焦共益債務融資與既存擔保債權之間的權利衝突，考察美國超級擔保優先權適用的「充分保護」要件，從受益說、博弈論、相對優先原則三維度邏輯論證中國大陸實務中擔保債權人自願簽署同意劣後於共益債務融資受償之承諾書的做法具有合法性與正當性。

Examining the status quo of judicial expansion of the type and time range of mutual benefit debt financing from practice, it is argued that the courts should follow the criteria of “common benefit” and “continue business for the debtor” to moderately expand and limit their boundaries. From the perspective of hermeneutics, clarify in Article 2 of the “Judicial Interpretation of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law III” that “the creditor who provides loans advocates that the reference to Article 42 (4) of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law shall give priority to the settlement of ordinary bankruptcy claims, and the people’s court shall support it” The specific meaning of the provisions, pointing out the defects of the clause is not logical and rigorous, it is recommended that China’s “Corporate Bankruptcy Law” should be corrected. Focusing on the conflict of rights between mutual benefit debt financing and existing secured claims, examining the “full protection” requirements for the application of the U.S. super guarantee priority, and logically demonstrating the guarantee creditors’ voluntary consent in China’s practice from the benefit theory, game theory, and relative priority The practice of postponing the commitment letter of mutual benefit debt financing is legal and justified.