經濟定錨、選舉與匯率危機

Nominal Anchors, Elections, and Exchange-Rate Crises

由於亞洲金融風暴的衝擊，使得取多學術界經濟理論遭受到真正的考驗。公共選擇學派的定錨論就是少數經得起現實考驗的政治經濟理論。針對台灣現實的需要，筆者將定錨重新修正，認為修正版是可以找出最優錨定的匯率政策、次優的貨幣政策、以及最末重要的財政政策。倘若執政黨在大選前遭遇經濟風暴，遵從定錨論修正版的經濟策略是可以對不利的經濟選戰作危機控管、並降低敗選的機率。定錨論修正版以經濟政策面及匯率制度面切入，並透過國際間的實例比較來支持公共選擇學派之論點：一旦最該定錨的經濟政治失敗，將導致全面性得政策失敗。此外本文也介紹適用於開發中國家的選舉性物價循環，並批露金融市場與選舉預測其最新的經濟投票研究走向。

Many economic theories that have enjoyed broad support in the academic world have been seriously challenged by the Asian economic crisis. Public choice arguments in support of the use of a nominal anchor, however, still appear valid. This article revises the original nominal anchor argument developed by Thomas D. Willett (1998) and applies it to the case of Taiwan. The results suggest that the most effective nominal anchor prior to an election is the exchange rate, the second most effective is monetary, and the least effective is fiscal. Through a comparison of economic and exchange rate policies in several countries, the most important finding of this paper is that if the most effective nominal anchor fails, domestic political and economic performance would be seriously impaired. In addition, this paper introduces the theory of Electoral Price Cycles, which appears especially relevant for developing economies, and extends previous economic voting studies concerning the relationship between financial market performance and election forecasting.