英文摘要 |
This research paper examines how the U.N. intervention worked in Libya in the past, and shows how China's voting action in the U.N. Security Council in the Libya case wasn't surprising-it was essentially Beijing's traditional approach. Usually when China has some doubt about U.N.'s invention, it does not tend to use its veto power to kill a resolution, but rather abstains from voting to consider all possibilities to protect national interests for change. It is not fair to judge this policy failure in hindsight, because had the Qaddafi regime won, the 'National Transitional Council' and the 'Libyan People's Army' would have become rebel forces for good, NATO could not have decided to continue its sanctions and military campaign against Libya, and people would have become skeptical about the Western model of 'humanitarian intervention': in other words, there is only a fine line between winner and loser. On the other hand, we should reconsider China's policy mistake in dealing with U.N.'s intervention in Libya. During the past 7 months, we could not see any practical and flexible diplomatic footing from China. It seems that Chinese authorities were bound by the existing rigid rules and could not accurately assess and respond to the situation. |