Towards Religious Institutionalism? The Future of the Regulation of Religious Institutions in Taiwan

邁向宗教團體主義？臺灣對於宗教團體之規範的未來

本文分析臺灣大法官解釋中針對宗教團體自治權的一個新出現的觀點。此一新的觀點乃是由陳新民大法官所提出。陳新民大法官於釋字第728號解釋之協同意見書中指出，宗教團體之結社權在憲法秩序中具獨特地位，宗教性質之結社權與一般性質之結社權不同，應受最嚴格之憲法保障。此一觀點相當不同於過去涉及宗教自由的相關大法官解釋中的一個潛在假設，亦即：宗教團體的規範及活動應受制於國家法律的權威之下。這種對於國家法律權威與宗教團體之間的關係的不同理解，類似於美國法學界近年來就「宗教團體主義」（religious institutionalism）之正當性所展開之辯論。本文分析此一辯論中之各方重要立場，並主張：有鑑於臺灣的社會文化背景，由Ira Lupu和Robert Tuttle所共同提出之觀點較值得我國參考。他們的觀點是：宗教團體的活動若與其獨特之宗教性有密切關聯時，得享有法律之特別對待。本文於文末根據此一理論見解，來評論陳新民大法官所提出之觀點，以及過去大法官解釋中就國家法律對於宗教團體之權威的潛在假設。

This article analyzes a newly emerging approach to the autonomy of religious institutions in Taiwan’s constitutional jurisprudence developed by Justice Chen Shin-Min of the Constitutional Court of Taiwan. In his concurring opinion in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 728, Justice Chen suggests that religious associations occupy a distinctive place in the ROC Constitution and thereby deserve a higher level of constitutional protection which is not enjoyed by other voluntary associations. This view is in contrast to an underlying assumption in the Court’s previous jurisprudence on freedom of religion, namely, that the norms and activities of religious groups are presumptively subject to the authority of state law. The divergent understandings of the authority of state law in relation to religious institutions in Taiwan’s current constitutional jurisprudence parallel the ongoing debate in the American legal scholarship over the idea of “religious institutionalism.” I discuss different perspectives proposed in this debate and argue that, in light of Taiwan’s specific circumstances, the approach developed by Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle--which claims that religious institutions are entitled to special treatment in law for their activities that are intimately connected with their distinctively religious quality--deserves more of our attention. I conclude by commenting on the ways in which both Justice Chen’s approach and the traditional assumption of the authority of state law over religion can be modified on the basis of Lupu and Tuttle’s theoretical arguments.