Functions of Directors’ and Officers’ (D＆O) Liability Insurance and Litigation Risk: An Empirical Legal Study of Taiwan

董監事責任保險之功能與訴訟風險：臺灣之法實證分析

本文以實證方法分析董監事責任保險於公司治理之功能，並檢驗了根本之問題：董監事之訴訟風險。本文主張，董監事之訴訟風險由於與保險基本之損失填補功能相關，在立法建議前應予釐清。本文首先探討董監事責任保險之需求與功能是否會受到訴訟風險之影響。而依據監督假說，公司治理品質較弱之公司應較可能購買董監事責任保險。然而，在實證檢驗從二○○八年到二○一四年之董監事責任保險購買與訴訟後，發現監督假說並未受到支持。而本文之第二部分，乃繼續針對信號假說進行實證檢驗，發現其較能得到支持。再考慮保險購買可能對於保險功能之影響，本文於第三部分分析了購買董監事責任保險後可能之投機行為，結果發現投機行為之證據並不顯著。基於上述發現，本文主張我國並無強制購買董監事責任保險以及限制最高保額之必要。

This paper empirically analyzes the functions of directors’ and officers’ (D＆O) liability insurance in corporate governance in Taiwan, it also reexamines the fundamental issue on the litigation risk of directors and officers. This research argues that litigation risk of directors, which is critically related to the fundamental function of insurance about indemnity, should be clarified before any legal revolution. This papers starts with examining whether the demand and functions of D＆O insurance are influenced by directors’ and officers’ litigation risk. The monitoring hypothesis suggests that firms with weak corporate governance have a greater incentive to purchase D＆O insurance. However, after empirically examining D＆O insurance purchases and relevant litigations in Taiwan from 2008 to 2014, it is found that the monitoring hypothesis is not supported. The second part of this research moves on to detailed empirical test of signal hypothesis of D＆O insurance and finds that it is supported. Considering risking behavior after insurance purchase may affect the functions of insurance, the third part analyzes possible opportunistic behavior caused by D＆O insurance. It is found that the evidence about opportunistic behavior is not significant. Based on these findings, the paper further argues and concludes that D＆O insurance should not be compulsory and legally capped in Taiwan.