臺灣財政失衡下之預算決策分析：政治經濟學之詮釋   全文下載

Budgeting Decision-making Analysis under Fiscal Imbalances in Taiwan: Interpretation of Political Economy

公共預算在本質上既是經濟的理性配置，更是政治的決策過程，國家財政結構化及收支失衡常是預算決策之最終產物，在決策過程之中，蘊涵著制度運作及權力分配過程。臺灣歷年來出現「結構性」財政赤字之常態，顯然已非單純傳統財政問題，外在政治環境、制度之改變對於預算決策過程產生重大影響力，以權力為主要分配資源的政治手段逐漸凌駕於以效率為價值的經濟手段。
本文以新制度經濟學途徑探討影響國家預算決策中「預算過程」、「預算紀律」及「預算監督」之問題，運用詮釋型政策分析及深度訪談之質性工具，以交易成本理論詮釋為何國內預算過程中致力於降低財政赤字之總體預算制度長期效果有限、強制性支出日益成長之本質及支出結構化之現象及問題；以共同資源理論詮釋國內財政紀律完備，財政情況卻日益惡化之矛盾現象，發現官僚仍存在追求寬鬆預算最大化的行為，且由於政治及經濟因素致使財政規範喪失糾正失衡的能力；最後，以代理人理論描繪預算制衡機制無法發揮及政治影響力大於理性監督等監督體系弱化的現象。

In essence, the public budgeting is a political economy. National fiscal imbalances are the final products of budget decision-making which implies an institutional operation and authority process. Obviously, long-term fiscal structural deficit over these years attributed to political and institutional changes rather than the traditional financial problems.
This paper discussed the budget decision-making issues including budget process, budget discipline and budget efficiency by way of New Institutional Economics. The author used the interpretation policy analysis and in-depth interviews method to describe and explain budgeting phenomenon in Taiwan and concluded the following findings: 1. Based on transactions costs theory, the macro-budgeting policy which the fiscal authority adopted since 1995 had limited long-term effect while mandatory spending continued to grow and created expenditure rigidities. 2. Maximizing slack budget was verified in view of common pool theory and the effect of fiscal discipline was weakened because of political instability and economic decline in Taiwan. 3. The budget monitor system was dysfunctional and political power was more than rational supervision in Taiwan were interpreted by agency theory.