Starting from Derrida’s indication that metaphysics is the common foundation which permits the encounter of theology and humanism in Lévinas’ thought, this essay attempts to respond Derrida’s criticism of Lévinas. This paper not only demonstrates the differences between ethical meaning and metaphysic in Lévinas’ thought through our reply, and discusses the relationship between divine and human according to Lévinas’ ethical perspectives, but also tries to respond the following questions: how does the subject of responsibility—who withstands the other—open himself and as a topological space which welcomes the advent of the sacred? How does the subject search for the immanent meaning of life within this wound of the openness? How does the subject situate himself between the tensions of metaphysical transcendence and immanence of life, experiencing the pain of being? How does the subject experience (erleben) life when strained in the pain of being?