陸象山與韓儒李寒洲「心即理」之比較──以道德動力根源為中心

The Comparison of the Concept of “Xin Ji Li” between Lu Xiang-Shan and Korean Confucian Li Han-Ju - Focus on the Source of Moral Motivation

本文旨在指出，陸象山與韓儒李震相雖同以「心即理」作為理論宗旨，但由於二人對道德動力根源的理解不同，故「心即理」說之內涵有不同。象山「心即理」指的是，本心自然發用即是道德之處，故本心發用亦可視為性體的發用。依此，推動一行動成為有道德的，根源在於「心」；而寒洲的「心即理」說則是建基於其「心是理氣合」之說。這是指，心同時具「性理與氣性」二內涵，故其可能以「性理之主宰作用」為主，也可能以「氣性之活動」為主。但只有前者才足以被稱為道德活動，故他以「心即理」說，強調心作為「道德主體」存在之價值，是在於心能以「心中之理的主宰作用」活動。依此，推動一行動成為有道德的根源是在於「心中之理」，而不在於「心自身」。

This paper aims to elucidate that although both Lu Xiang-Shan and Korean Confucian Li Han-Ju take “Xin Ji Li” as the tenet of their theories, it is because they hold different understandings about the source of moral motivation, which leads to their different understandings towards “Xin Ji Li”. While Xiang-Shan talks about “Xin Ji Li”, he believes that the mind(Xin)'s expression is naturally reasonable, therefore the mind's expression is equal to the principle(Li). According to Xiang-Shan, it is “mind” that makes an action become a moral action. On the other hand, the concept of “Xin Ji Li” by Han-Ju is different. Han-Ju claims that “mind is the combination of Li and Chi”, which means Li and Chi are both inside the mind, and the activity may be controlled by “principle(Li)” or “Chi”. But only when activities are controlled by principle(Li), which is equal to principle, then those activities can be considered as “moral activities”. To show the value of the mind, the mind must exist as a moral subject, Han-Ju emphasized that all activities controlled by the mind must be based on principle(Li). According to this, the source of moral motivation is the principle, which is in the mind.