董事政治連結及其受關注程度與公司避稅之關聯性

Directors' Political Connection, Outsiders' Attention, and Corporate Tax Avoidance

本研究以2012年至2017年間臺灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討公司董事會成員具 政治連結及其受關注程度與公司避稅之關聯性。國內的媒體發達，具有政治連結之 董事普遍受到外界高度關注，本文以 Google 搜尋量指數作為關注程度的代理變數， 研究結果發現當董事會成員具有政治連結且受外部關注程度較高時，對於公司避稅 行為有顯著負向的關聯，表示具有政治連結的董事，其衍生的「聲譽效果」大於「門 神效果」，進而抑制管理階層所從事的避稅行為。

This study, using data from 2012-2017 Taiwanese listed companies as sample, examines how the political connections of a company's board of directors relate to outsiders attention and corporate tax avoidance. Media is highly developed in Taiwan, and company directors with political connections receive wide public attention. Using Google search volume index (SVI) as a proxy variable for the degree of outsiders attention, the study finds that when board directors with political connections and wider outsiders attentions have significant negative impact on corporate tax avoidance. It indicates that the "reputation effect" derived from directors' political connections is greater than the "guardians effect", thereby inhibiting management's corporate tax avoidance.