英文摘要 |
The procedure of WTO dispute settlement mechanism is basically designed on the considerations of ''flexibility''. The EC-Bananas case has posted a great challenge to the Dispute Settlement mechanism. EC resisted complying with appellate body's recommendations and rulings, by means of the dispute procedure pursuant to article 21 and 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, for more than 3 years after the expiration of the implementation period. The EC-Bananas case showed that loosing parties are possible to delay the reasonable period of time via the procedural conflict between article 21.5 and article 22.6 of the DSU. This article concludes that the Great Powers, such as USA, EU and Japan, could boycott the implementation of DSB's recommendations and rulings via WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. But the weak countries could not counter the strong states' demands because they lack the sufficient resources to take benefits from the WTO dispute settlement mechanism |